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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES AND BEVERLY O'ROURKE, ] 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Respondent. 
i Appeal No. 910198 
i Priority #15 
BRIEF OR RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1987 & Supp. 1991) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following issues are presented by this appeal for 
review by the Utah Supreme Court: 
1. Whether James O'Rourke was domiciled in Utah 
during 19 83 through 1988, thereby being subject to Utah 
individual income tax. 
2. Whether the Utah State Tax Commission is estopped 
from assessing taxes against James O'Rourke due to statements of 
one of its employees• 
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This case was initiated after January 1, 1988, 
therefore the applicable standard of review of the Commission's 
action is set out in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) which provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject 
to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is; 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
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facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). See Morton International v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah June 24, 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-103(1)(j) (Supp. 1991): 
"Resident individual" means: 
(i) an individual who is domiciled in this state for 
any period of time during the taxable year, but only for the 
duration of such period; or 
(ii) an individual who is not domiciled in this state 
but maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and 
spends in the aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year 
in this state. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543 (1987): 
In any proceeding before the commission under this 
chapter, the burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989): 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
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(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that 
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court; 
Rules 
Utah Administrative Code R861-1-7A (1991): 
G. Burden of Proof, The petitioning party shall have 
the burden of proof to establish that his petition should be 
granted, 
H. Degree of Proof. The degree of proof in a hearing 
before the Commission shall be the same as in a judicial 
proceeding brought in the state courts of Utah. 
Utah Administrative Code R865-9-2l(D) (1991): 
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has a 
true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and 
to which place he has (whenever he is absent) the intention 
of returning. It is the place in which a person has 
voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not 
for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with the 
present intention of making a permanent home. After 
domicile has been established, two things are necessary to 
create a new domicile: first, an abandonment of the old 
domicile; and second, the intention and establishment of a 
new domicile. The mere intention to abandon a domicile once 
established is not of itself sufficient to create a new 
domicile; for before a person can be said to have changed 
his domicile, a new domicile must be shown. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a final order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission which held that James O'Rourke (hereafter 
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"Mr. O'Rourke") was domiciled in Utah, thereby subjecting him to 
Utah individual income tax. 
Based upon information that Mr. O'Rourke was a resident 
individual for purposes of state income tax, the Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission assessed Mr. O'Rourke 
for individual income tax for the period of time from 1983 
through 1988. Mr. O'Rourke filed an undated Petition for 
Redetermination asking the Tax Commission to review the actions 
of the Auditing Division. An amended petition dated March 6, 
1990 was filed by Mr. O'Rourke's counsel. 
A formal hearing was held before the Tax commission on 
January 14, 1991, during which testimony was presented by Mr. 
O'Rourke and the Auditing Division. The Tax Commission issued 
its decision dated April 2, 1991, finding that Mr. O'Rourke was 
domiciled in Utah during the years 1983 through 1988, and was 
therefore subject to Utah individual income tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the period of time from 1983 through 1988, 
the O'Rourkes did not file Utah state income tax returns. 
Federal income tax returns were filed by the O'Rourkes during the 
audit period showing a filing status as "married filing joint 
return" and identifying their address as 3712 East Viewcrest 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 158, 166, 181, 193, 203, 
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and 215) The state of Florida does not assess individual income 
tax, 
2. James O'Rourke was a pilot for Eastern Airlines 
during the audit period. He had been a Captain with Eastern 
since approximately January of 1980. (Tr. at 12) As a captain, 
his W-2 income for the audit period was $94,148.88 in 1983, 
$96,589.93 in 1984, $111,216.22 in 1985, $99,911.37 in 1986, 
$93,125.92 in 1987, and $90,908.75 in 1988 (R. at 158, 166, 181, 
193, 203, and 215) 
3. Beverly O'Rourke was not employed during the audit 
period. (Tr. at 9) 
4. In 1980, while the O'Rourkes and their four 
children were residing in Miami, Florida, they decided to move 
from Miami because of the growing problem of crime in the Miami 
area. (Tr. at 14) 
5. From January, 1981 through May, 1981, the 
O'Rourkes purchased two parcels of property totalling 
approximately 40 acres in central Florida which contained 
approximately 32 acres of orange groves. (Tr. at 14, 15, 20, 64, 
65) Their stated intent was to build a home on the central 
Florida property. (Tr. at 18-19) 
6. As a result of freezes in 1981, 1983, and 1984, 
the orange groves on the O'Rourke's property were severely 
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damaged and failed to produce the marketable crops they had 
anticipated. (Tr. at 20, 30, and 33-34) The O'Rourkes sold 10 
acres of their central Florida property in 1984. (Tr. at 34-35) 
The balance of the central Florida property was sold in 1987. 
(Tr. at 39) 
7. In mid-1982, the O'Rourkes sought to locate their 
family in a city where there were cultural opportunities, no 
"big-city" problems, a reasonable weather pattern, educational 
opportunities, recreational opportunities, and which was near the 
Eastern Airlines route system. They considered moving to the 
central Florida area, Albuquerque, Colorado Springs, Salt Lake 
City, Phoenix, or Seattle. (Tr. at 24, 378) They personally 
inspected approximately 14 or 15 houses in the central Florida 
area. (Tr. at 23) They eventually decided on Salt Lake City. 
8. The O'Rourkes sold their home in Miami, Florida in 
July, 1982. (Tr. at 63) 
9. The O'Rourkes purchased a home at 3712 East 
Viewcrest Circle in the Olympus Cove area of Salt Lake City in 
August of 1982. (Tr. at 25-26) They purchased the home for 
$125,000, making a $45,000 down payment and financing $80,000 
over 30 years. (Tr. at 64, R. at 381) During the first eight 
months of occupancy, they spent approximately $9,000 or $10,000 
to rebuild the kitchen and add a bathroom to their Salt Lake City 
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home* (Tr. at 52-53 and 65-67) The O'Rourkes and their children 
occupied this home from August, 1982 through June, 1989. 
10. In approximately April, 1983, the O'Rourkes 
purchased a home at 8531 South 1575 East in Salt Lake City for 
occupancy by James O'Rourke's parents who had moved to Salt Lake 
City several months earlier. In connection with this purchase, 
they refinanced their Olympus Cove home. The second home was 
purchased for $50,000 with the O'Rourkes making a $10,000 down 
payment and financing $40,000 over 30 years. (R. at 382) The 
O'Rourkes made substantial improvements to this home by adding a 
garage, adding a sliding door and deck, and redoing the home's 
plumbing and electrical wiring. (Tr. at 29) 
11. In August, 1982 when the O'Rourkes moved to Utah, 
they had a daughter age 18, a daughter age 16, and a son and 
daughter (twins) age 13. Upon moving to Utah, the 16 year old 
daughter attended Skyline High School and the twins attended 
Churchill Junior High School and later Skyline High School. (Tr. 
at 83-84, R. at 389) 
12. During the audit period, the O'Rourkes registered 
and licensed six automobiles in the state of Utah. (R. at 386) 
They also paid personal property taxes in the state of Utah on 
these vehicles. 
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13. During the audit period, the O'Rourkes maintained 
local bank accounts in the state of Utah from which household 
expenses and bills were paid. (Tr. at 79) 
14. During the audit period, Beverly O'Rourke 
maintained a Utah driver's license, was a member of local church, 
and registered to vote in -the state of Utah. (Tr. at 85) 
15. James O'Rourke's employment as a pilot for Eastern 
Airlines required that he have an Eastern Airlines hub city 
designated as his "home base" from which his flight assignments 
would originate and terminate. During the audit period, his 
"home base" was originally New York City, then changed to 
Houston, and later changed to Atlanta. (Tr. at 80, 91-96) 
16. As a pilot, Mr. O'Rourke was guaranteed ten to 11 
days per month off of work. (Tr. at 13) Generally, when he had 
the opportunity, he returned to Salt Lake City. (Tr. at 99-100) 
During the audit period, Mr. O'Rourke spent an average of 112 
days per year in Utah. (Tr. at 53) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When considered as a whole, the O'Rourke's activities 
demonstrate that their state of domicile is Utah. The O'Rourkes 
made an informed decision to move to Utah with indefinite plans 
regarding their wishes to return to Florida. Upon arrival, they 
purchased a home, enrolled their children in local schools, and 
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otherwise enjoyed the benefits of living in Utah. The fact that 
Mr. O'Rourke's employment required that he be away from his home 
and family for an extended period each year should not influence 
the decision on domicile. It is clear that the O'Rourkes 
established their home in Utah and intended to remain in Utah for 
an indefinite time. 
Sound public policy dictates that the Tax Commission 
should not be estopped from making an otherwise proper assessment 
for taxes due to an incorrect determination made by an employee 
based on minimal facts. The Commission should be permitted to 
exercise the authority it has been granted in administering the 
tax code and should not be bound by unappealed decision of its 
subordinates. This approach is consistent with rulings relating 
to statements of agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The O'Rourkes Did Not Meet Their Burden of Proof at the 
Hearing. 
In the hearing belowf the O'Rourkes had the burden of 
establishing that their petition for relief from income taxes 
should be granted. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543 (1987). The 
question in this case was whether Mr. O'Rourke's domicile was in 
Utah. The evidentiary weight necessary to establish domicile is 
by a preponderance. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicile § 91 (1966). 
Therefore, Mr. O'Rourke was required below to show by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that he was not a resident of (i.e. 
was not domiciled in) Utah during the audit years. 
A. Mr. O'Rourke Had to Show That Florida Was His "True, Fixed, 
Permanent Home and Principal Establishment" 
Utah imposes an individual income tax on "resident 
individuals." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-103 provides: 
(j) "Resident individual" means: 
(i) an individual who is domiciled 
in this state for any period of 
time during the taxable year, but 
only for the duration of such 
period; or 
(ii) an individual who is not 
domiciled in this state but 
maintains a permanent place of 
abode in this state and spends in 
the aggregate 183 or more days of 
the taxable year in this state. 
For purposes of this Subsection 
(ii), a fraction of a calendar day 
shall be counted as a whole day. 
There is little question that Beverly O'Rourke and the 
O'Rourke children would be considered resident individuals since 
they lived in Utah for the majority of each calendar year during 
the audit period. Because of the requirements of his employment, 
James O'Rourke did not spend at least 183 days per year at his 
home in Salt Lake City. This apparently necessitates a finding 
that he was domiciled in Utah in order to be considered a 
resident individual. 
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Utah Administrative Code R865-9-2I (D) provides the 
following definition of domicile: "'Domicile' means the place 
where an individual has a true, fixed, permanent home and 
principal establishment, and to which place he has (whenever he 
is absent) the intention of returning." The evidence was very 
clear that Mr, O'Rourke had a permanent home in Utah from 1982 
until 1989 where his family lived. Not only was the home in Utah 
his principle residence during this period, it was also the home 
to which he returned whenever absent, 
Mr. O'Rourke's task at the Commission level was to show 
by a preponderance that Florida, and not Utah, was his "true, 
fixed, permanent home . . ,to which place he has (whenever 
absent) the intention of returning." He offered the purchase of 
an orange grove as evidence of his commitment to Florida. Final 
Decision at 2-3. He insisted that throughout the audit period his 
intention was always to return to Florida. The Commission 
considered this evidence but was persuaded by other factors that 
Florida was not the "true, fixed and permanent home." The 
Commission was influenced by the reality that the O'Rourke's home 
was in Utah. Mr. O'Rourke purchased a home in Utah, he moved his 
family to Utah, he remodeled the Utah home, he moved his parents 
to Utah, and he lived in Utah for six years. Final Decision at 2-
5. The Commission also gave weight to the fact that there was no 
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home in Florida during this period for the O'Rourkes to reside in 
or to return to. Final Decision at 8. Although Mr. O'Rourke 
presented evidence that his true home to which he always intended 
to relocate was in Florida, in the Commission's eyes, he did not 
meet his burden by the preponderance. 
B. Mr. O'Rourke Had to Show That Utah Was a Home for a "Special 
or Temporary Purpose" and That He Had No "Present Intention 
of Making a Permanent Home" in Utah 
Mr. O'Rourke made his home in Utah for over six years 
from 1982 to 1989. Final Decision at 4. During this time, he 
"purchased a home in Utah, . . . expended a significant amount of 
money in improving that home; . . . moved his wife and children 
with him to Utah, . . . [had his] children attend[J Utah schools; 
. . • purchased a second home in Utah into which his parent 
moved; . . . registered [his automobiles] in Utah; and . . . 
returned [to Utah] whenever absent." Final Decision at 8, 9. It 
appears very clear from this evidence that Mr. O'Rourke's 
permanent home during this time was in Utah. 
Mr. O'Rourke argued that he did not intend Utah to be 
his permanent home, but that it was a temporary home until he 
could financially afford to return to Florida. Final Decision at 
8. The Tax Commission listened to this argument, but again it 
was not persuaded. The Commission was troubled by the fact that 
the O'Rourkes remained in Utah for a long time without a definite 
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time to return to Florida. Final Decision at 8. It was also 
troubled by the vagueness of the O'Rourke's intention which 
seemed more like a hope than a firm plan. Final Decision at 7. 
Finally, the fact that Mr. O'Rourke paid no income tax to any 
state during this audit period (Florida has no income tax, see 
Tr. at 88) left the Commission uneasy. Final Decision at 5. 
The Commission decided that the O'Rourke's permanent 
home was in Utah during this period. Utah Admin. Code R865-9-
21(D) provides that domicile is "a place in which a person has 
voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a 
mere special or temporary purpose, but with the present intention 
of making a permanent home." The Commission chose to give the 
O'Rourke's claim of wanting to return to Florida only little 
weight and to consider instead that Mr. O'Rourke and his family 
owned a home and lived in Utah over a six year period with an 
unknown departure date. These facts compelled the conclusion 
that Mr. O'Rourke had a present intention to make Utah his 
permanent home. 
C. The O'Rourkes Had to Show That They Had Not Abandoned their 
Old Domicile and That They Lacked the Intent to Establish a 
New Domicile. 
In the administrative context, the petitioner carries 
the burden of proving that his petition should be granted. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-543 (1987). Mr. O'Rourke is claiming that 
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despite all appearances, his domicile is not in Utah but in 
Florida. To defeat the audit's presumption of correctness, Mr. 
O'Rourke must show that he did not abandon his domicile as 
appearances suggest and he did not intend to establish a new 
domicile in Utah. "Domicile is presumed to follow residency and 
the burden of proof is on the person contending to the contrary." 
Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978). 
The Commission considered Mr. O'Rourke's testimony 
"that it was always his intention to construct a home on the 
Eustis property and live in Florida permanently." Final Decision 
at 7. It also heard the testimony that he "never intended to 
make Utah his permanent home." Final Decision at 8. The 
Commission gave some—but not conclusive—weight to the stated 
intentions. "Declarations of intention or purpose are, of course, 
admissible, but they must give way to definite and unequivocal 
acts and conduct." New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772, 784 
(Del. 1940); "[t]he actual fact as to the place of residence and 
decedent's real attitude and intention with respect to it as 
disclosed by his entire course of conduct are the controlling 
factors in ascertaining his domicile." Texas v. Florida, 306 
U.S. 398, 425 (1939). The Commission heard evidence on all 
issues relevant to the issue of domicile and found the following 
factors to be decisive: 
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[Mr. O'Rourke's] actions in Utah sufficiently 
demonstrate his intention to make Utah his domicile 
while here. In support of that finding are the facts 
that he purchased a home in Utah, and then expended a 
significant amount of money in improving that home; he 
moved his wife and children with him to Utah, and while 
here, his children attended Utah schools; he purchased 
a second home in Utah into which his parents moved; his 
automobiles were registered in Utah; and, that it was 
his Utah home to which he returned whenever absent from 
it. 
Final Decision at 8, 9. There were other factors weighing 
against this finding and other factors not mentioned in the 
Commission's Decision and Order which further supported it. For 
example, case law states "the practical general rule that a man's 
home is where his family is" has so few exceptions, that the 
place of the family's residence is prima facie evidence of the 
husband's. Waushara County v. Calumet County, 238 Wis. 230, 298 
N.W. 613 (1941). During the hearing it became clear that the 
O'Rourke family considered Utah to be their state of residence. 
The O'Rourke's oldest daughter attended the University of Utah, 
claimed resident-status, and paid resident-tuition. Tr. at 83. 
Other evidence showed that Mrs. O'Rourke obtained a driver's 
license in Utah, had membership in a local church in Utah, 
registered to vote and voted in Utah. Tr. at 85. Moreover, 
there was evidence that at various times throughout the audit 
period, the O'Rourkes owned, registered and drove in Utah six 
different cars. Tr. at 80-81. These are typical factors which 
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courts have given weight in determining a person's domicile• See 
Unaue v. Unaue, 532 N.Y.S. 2d 769, 774-75 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1988). 
The Tax Commission reviewed the testimony and other evidence and 
determined that the O'Rourkes had abandoned their domicile in 
Florida and had established a new domicile in Utah. Final 
Decision at 8. Utah Admin. Code R865-9-2I(D) states "two things 
are necessary to create a new domicile: first, an abandonment of 
the old domicile; and second, the intention and establishment of 
a new domicile." On a review of all the evidence, the 
Commission determined that these two conditions had been met. 
There were ample grounds in the Commission's decision to support 
its conclusion and ample additional grounds in the record— 
including a greater reliance on the residence and activity of Mr. 
O'Rourke's family in Utah as indicative that Mr. O'Rourke's 
domicile was also in Utah. 
II. The Commission is not estopped from reconsidering Mr. 
0'Rourke's tax s tatus. 
The O'Rourkes would have the Tax Commission estopped 
from hearing evidence concerning their tax liability. They claim 
that the statement of an auditor should preclude the Commission 
from further review into their income tax liability. The facts 
giving rise to the estoppel argument were as follows: 
1. The Tax Commission sent Mr. 0'Rourke a letter 
requesting verification of his taxable status. 
Tr. at 60. 
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2. Mr. O'Rourke and tax agent Robert Laird met and 
discussed his tax status for the 1984 tax year. 
Tr. at 60. 
3. Mr. Laird saw Mr. O'Rourke's Florida Driver's 
License and on that basis determined that he was 
not a Utah resident. Mr. Laird wrote the 
notation: "N/A" on the letter. Tr. at 60. 
4. Mr. Laird indicated that Mr. O'Rourke would not be 
liable for taxes in future years either. Tr. at 60 -
61. 
5. Mr. Brent Barney, tax audit manager and Mr. 
Laird's supervisor, re-initiated an audit on Mr. 
O'Rourke's tax status and performed additional 
research. Tr. at 110. 
Mr. O'Rourke now asserts that Mr. Laird's statements should be 
binding on the Tax Commission. This position is unrealistic. The 
record shows that Mr. Laird decided the question of domicile 
based on limited information. The record also indicates that his 
supervisor took steps to review Mr. Laird's decision. Presumably 
that review resulted in the Tax Commission's present assessment 
against the O'Rourkes. The Tax Commission should not be 
precluded from correcting mistakes of its agents. 
A. The Tax Commission Has the Duty to Administer the Tax Law 
The legislature has commissioned the Tax Commission "to 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the state," Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-210 (5) (1987), and to "exercise all powers necessary 
in the performance of its duties." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 
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(25) (1987). In this case, a taxpayer and his family owned a 
home and lived in Utah for extensive periods without paying state 
income tax. Although the tax agent determined from limited 
information that this taxpayer, James O'Rourke, did not owe 
taxes, it was the Tax Commission's duty to investigate further 
when more information became available. 
B. The Tax Commission is Not Bound in the Traditional Sense by 
the Conduct of its Agents 
Because the Tax Commission has been given the public charge 
to administer the taxation laws for the benefit of all the 
citizens, the law allows it considerable leeway to perform these 
duties. Importantly, it is rarely bound by the principles of 
estoppel which apply between private parties. This is so 
because: 
When the Government is unable to enforce the law 
because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an 
estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in 
obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for 
this reason that it is well settled that the Government 
may not be estopped on the same terms as any other 
litigant. 
Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). 
The Tax Commission, therefore, is not easily estopped from 
"administer[ing] and supervising] the tax laws," and should not 
be estopped in this case. 
This court has recently recognized the Tax Commission as the 
ultimate authority on issues of taxation. In Morton 
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International v. Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv. Rep, 34 
(Utah June 24, 1991), the Utah Supreme Court did not permit the 
inconsistent policies of Tax Commission auditors to preclude the 
Commission from making tax rulings, "To hold otherwise would be 
to bind the Commission by the unappealed decisions of its 
subordinates. It is the Commission that has been granted 
authority to administer the tax code." Ld., 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
41. When the positions taken by the Tax Commission and its 
auditors are inconsistent, the position of the auditors must give 
way. This holding "recognizes the Commission's authority over 
its own employees," Id., , 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41, and the 
Commission's right to review and resolve mistakes of its agents. 
In Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 721 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that "the rule which 
precludes the assertion of estoppel against the government is 
sound and generally should be applied . . . ." The court noted 
it would make an exception to the general rule "where the 
interests of justice mandate," JLd., however, this case is not 
such an instance. Mr. O'Rourke lived in Utah, owned property in 
Utah, and utilized the services of the government and the 
benefits of the state of Utah for an extended period of time. 
Mr. O'Rourke took advantage of these privileges over a six year 
period and his family benefitted from these privileges 
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continually over the same period. The equities in this case 
require that Mr. O'Rourke be subject to Utah state income taxes 
as a resident individual. 
C. In the Federal System, the Statements of IRS Agents Do Not 
Estop the IRS from Correcting Mistakes 
It is helpful ta- analogize with the federal tax system 
where: 
an Internal Revenue Service agent does not 
have authority to make a final determination 
binding on the government, and therefore an 
erroneous statement made by an agent cannot 
be considered as binding. When prior 
inconsistent advice has been given, the 
estoppel doctrine does not prevent the 
Internal Revenue Service from correcting 
errors of law. 
Louderback v. United States. 500 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Colo. 
19 80) (citations omitted). In the federal tax context when an 
agent has given misinformation, a court's: 
consideration of the interests of justice and 
fairness . . . does not rely upon any legal 
concept of estoppel or reliance. . . . [T]he 
United States Government will not be bound or 
estopped by a position taken or 
misinformation given by one of its employees 
or agents, nor is a taxpayer reliance 
argument availing. 
Herbert v. United States. 662 F. Supp. 573, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(citations omitted). These decisions rely upon the importance of 
the tax collector-function and the public need that these 
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functions are performed properly. The Utah State Tax Commission 
requires similar leeway to perform its functions and should not 
be precluded from correcting its agents mistakes. 
CONCLUSION 
When considered as a whole, the O'Rourke's activities 
demonstrate that their state of domicile is Utah. The O'Rourkes 
made an informed decision to move to Utah with indefinite plans 
regarding their wishes to return to Florida. Upon arrival, they 
purchased a home, enrolled their children in local schools, and 
otherwise enjoyed the benefits of living in Utah. The fact that 
Mr. O'Rourke's employment required that he be away from his home 
and family for an extended period each year should not influence 
the decision on domicile. It is clear that the O'Rourkes 
established their home in Utah and intended to remain in Utah for 
an indefinite time. 
Sound public policy dictates that the Tax Commission 
should not be estopped from making an otherwise proper assessment 
for taxes due to an incorrect determination made by an employee 
based on minimal facts. The Commission should be permitted to 
exercise the authority it has been granted in administering the 
tax code and should not be bound by unappealed decision of its 
subordinates. This approach is consistent with rulings relating 
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to statements of agents of the Internal Revenue Service. 
The Tax Commission respectfully requests that its 
decision be upheld, 
DATED this 7~4^ t day of October, 1991. 
MARK'E. WAINWRIJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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